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“And this is one of the major questions of
our lives: how we keep boundaries, what
permission we have to cross boundaries,
and how we do so.”
– A.B. Yehoshua

INTRODUCTION
The boundary is a concept ancient to human civilization, applicable to both the tangible and intangible aspects of our lives. Internally we deliberate moral or spiritual boundaries, while externally
we struggle amongst one another to establish geographical boundaries. Especially throughout the development of Western Civilization
and democracy, in the least, boundaries have become an essential
characteristic of the westerner’s individual freedoms. Albeit a doctrine of criminal law, take for example the Castle Doctrine, 1 which,
* Associate, Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier, McElligot, Fontenot, Gideon &
Edwards, LLP; J.D./D.C.L. (May 2017), Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University. The author would like to thank Professors Olivier Moréteau and
Randall Trahan for their guidance in preparing this note. Further, the author
wishes to acknowledge the diligent efforts put forth by the Journal of Civil Law
Studies’ staff.
1. See Castle Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (10th ed., West
2014); the Castle Doctrine is defined as, “[a]n exception to the retreat rule allowing the use of deadly force by a person who is protecting his or her home and its
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in essence, represents the value we as a society appropriate to personal boundaries.
In the civil law, one may establish the boundary to his land
through a boundary action. A boundary action is considered a real
action. A person may bring a real action in order to assert rights specifically in, to, or upon immovable property. 2 There are a number of
real actions provided for in Title II of the Louisiana Civil Code, three
of which were explored in the case presented herein, Hooper v. Hero
Lands Company 3 (Hooper II): petitory, possessory, and boundary
actions. Each of the three actions considered in Hooper II are distinguishable, however, as we so often find, distinctions are not easily
drawn.
Hooper II takes up these real actions, as well as a trespass action, 4 which is not treated as a real action by the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure, and considers some age-old disputes in Louisiana
jurisprudence, much of which has assumedly been put to rest. However, there appears to have surfaced some slight disparity between
circuits—particularly the First and Fourth—which are worth noting.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1860, following the long and controversial litigation over the
estate of eccentric miser and real estate spectacular John
McDonogh, a particular portion of his vast land-holdings was prepared for subdivision. 5 The land, known as the Cazelard Plantation,

inhabitants from attack, especially from a trespasser who intends to commit a felony or inflict serious bodily harm.”
2. LA. CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 422 (2017).
3. Hooper v. Hero Lands Co., 15-0929, p.5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/16); 216
So.3d 965, 970, writ denied, 16- 0971 (La. 9/16/16); 206 So.3d 205 (mem) [hereinafter Hooper II].
4. Though it bears a resemblance to real actions, in that it concerns entering
onto immovable property without permission, no attempt has been made to include, inter alia, the action for trespass within Title II. See Melissa Morris Cresson, The Louisiana Trespass Action: A “Real” Problem, 56 LA. L. REV. 477, 477
n.5 (1995).
5. See Executors of McDonogh v. Murdoch, 56 U.S. 367 (1854).
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was inherited by the City of New Orleans from McDonogh and located generally in “down the bayou,” Louisiana, 6 specifically encompassing lands within Jefferson, Orleans, and Plaquemines parishes. 7 The land was subdivided into 44 lots, each notably one arpent in size, 8 or approximately 192 feet wide, and was put up for
public auction by New Orleans. 9 As a result of the auction, Alphonse
Camus purchased lots 17-26 and Pierre Cazelar, Jr., purchased lots
27-44. 10 Legal description was made and good title was recorded
upon these transactions, of which was eventually passed to the parties in the case before us. 11
Detailing the history of the property back nearly 160 years is not
mere fluff to draw in the reader’s attention. The fact that the property
was divided into arpents is not unsubstantial; indeed the issue in
Hooper II was born of the lot measurements. Moreover, prior to the
public auction in 1860, the City of New Orleans hired Louis Pilie, a
surveyor, to comprise a plat of the property. 12 Both plaintiffs and
defendants in Hooper II relied on the Pilie plat for their property
description. 13
The particular boundary in contention is between lots 26 and 27.
In Hooper I, the plaintiffs, Patsy and James Hooper (the “Hoopers”),
have owned lot 26 since 1992, 14 while the Hero Lands Company
6. “Down the bayou” is a vernacular phrase used liberally by Louisianans
when describing a broad area of the state, generally south of Interstate 10 (e.g.,
when one hails from Houma, Louisiana, one might say, “He’s from down the
bayou”).
7. Original Appellee Brief of Defendants Hero Lands Company and Allen
Hero, Hooper v. Hero Lands Co., No. 15- 0929, (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/19/15) (appellate brief).
8. See Arpent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1; an arpent is 192
feet.
9. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 969.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 973.
14. Hooper v. Hero Lands Co., 13-0576 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/11/13); 128 So.
3d 691, 692 [hereinafter Hooper I]. Important to note for purposes of prescription,
Hooper acquired lot 26 in 1992, in good faith and just title, from Burmaster Land
& Development Co., who was also in good faith possession of lot 26 since 1974.
Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 969.
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(“Hero”), owns lots 27-35. 15 The lots are situated laterally west to
east, with lot 26 being the most westerly. 16 Just as the Pilie plat described each lot to be the same width, according to the titles, each
lot is 192 feet wide. 17 Therefore, the total width of lots 26-35 would
be 1,920 feet. However, it turns out the distance is 2,040.77 feet—a
surplus of 120.77 feet. 18 Therein lies the controversy. Additionally,
on the eastern side of lot 26 there existed a fence, which was maintained and considered by the Hoopers to be the boundary line between lots 26 and 27. 19
In 2012, Hero authorized the local government to dig a thirtyfive foot drainage canal on the western boundary of lot 27. 20 When
plotting the drainage canal, the government’s surveyor used the lot
titles, which mathematically caused the canal to overlap across the
boundary between lots 26 and 27. With the disparity unbeknownst
to Hero and the government, preparations to dig the drainage canal
commenced which resulted in a trespass onto the Hoopers’ property. 21 As a result, the Hoopers filed suit claiming trespass and asserting a possessory and boundary action, along with a request for
injunctive relief. 22
The trial court granted temporary injunctive relief to the Hoopers, enjoining the government from continuing to dig the canal. 23
Nevertheless, the government adopted a resolution to expropriate
the property and continue the project, allegedly without notice to the
Hoopers. 24 The resolution to expropriate the land introduces a fold
in the case considered in Hooper I, 25 but not in Hooper II.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 968.
Id. at 969.
Id.
Id. at 968.
Hooper’s Third Amended Petition at 2-3.
Hooper I, 128 So.3d at 693.
Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 968.
Id.
Hooper I, 128 So.3d at 693.
Id.
Id. at 692.
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Presented to the court were a number of arguments asserting the
Hoopers’ rights to the entire surplus 120.77 feet, of which they
claimed was encompassed within the fence line. 26 Hooper asserted
ownership of the surplus by “Possession Within Title,” arguing that
the 120.77 foot strip of land “constituted the ‘more than one arpent’”
as provided in the title description, “one arpent more or less.” 27 Additionally, the Hooper’s provided evidence of corporeal possession. 28 Furthermore, by tacking possession to their ancestors-in-title, 29 the Hooper’s asserted ownership by acquisitive prescription of
ten-years and thirty-years. 30 Thus, the Hoopers asserted ownership
by possession, title, and prescription. 31 Finally, the Hooper’s prayed
for the court to establish the boundary line. 32
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The court in Hooper II addressed the following issues:
–

Whether the Hoopers had improperly cumulated their possessory action with a petitory action; 33
– Whether the Hoopers had acquired ownership to the surplus
120.77 feet of property: (1) by title; 34 (2) by ten-year acquisitive prescription; 35 and (3) by thirty-year acquisitive prescription; 36
– Whether the trial court properly fixed the boundary. 37

26. Hooper’s Third Amended Petition at 2-3.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2-3.
29. The possession of the transferor is tacked to that of the transferee if there
has been no interruption of possession. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3442 (2017).
30. Hooper’s Third Amended Petition at 2, para 5.
31. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970.
32. Hooper’s Third Amended Petition at 21.
33. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970.
34. Id. at 971-72.
35. Id. at 972.
36. Id. at 972-73.
37. Id. at 973-74.
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On the issue of the Hoopers’ improper cumulation of a petitory
and possessory action, the court reversed the trial court, ruling the
Hoopers improperly cumulated, “demonstrated by [the Hoopers’]
assertions of ownership by title and by prescription, and their request to fix the boundary line.” 38 Thus, according to the court, the
Hoopers waived their possessory action. However, as discussed supra, the Hooper’s petition made no mention of the action being petitory, as well, cumulation of a boundary action with either a petitory
or possessory should not be considered improper—article 3657 of
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure overtly does not prohibit such
cumulation. 39
With regard to the Hoopers’ attempt to show ownership by title—a petitory action—the court found the addition of “more or
less” to an arpent was not sufficient to show better title than Hero.40
Next, albeit the Hoopers had sufficient ten-year corporeal possession, the court found the description on the deed to their tract insufficient to show the just title necessary to achieve ten-year acquisitive
prescription. 41 Further, the court noted that because the Hooper’s
immediate ancestor-in-title, Burmaster Land & Development Company (“Burmaster”), leased lot 26 for the years leading up to the
Hoopers’ purchase, Burmaster was a precarious possessor. 42 To acquire by thirty-year acquisitive prescription, one must have adverse
corporeal possession; therefore, because Burmaster did not acquire
ownership to lot 26 until December 31, 1989, adverse possession
did not being until January 1, 1990—not soon enough for the Hoopers to acquire via thirty-year prescription. 43
Despite the Hoopers’ argument that apportionment “foreign” to
Louisiana law, the court affirmed the trial court order, finding “as a
matter of law, [utilizing] equal apportionment among the ten lots [to
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 970.
See LA. CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 3657 (2017).
Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 971.
Id.
Id. at 972.
Id.
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fix the boundary] was the correct method to divide the disputed
property.” 44 Nonetheless, the court realized that neither judgment
had provided for a particularized description of the property as required by Louisiana Civil Code of Procedure article 1919 and, therefore, remanded with instruction to provide an accurate legal property
description. 45
III. COMMENTARY
Possession and ownership are separate things, which require
separate legal actions to determine: petitory and possessory. Article
3657 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure prohibits the cumulation or alternative pleading of petitory and possessory actions, the
penalty of such cumulation being the abatement of the possessory
action. The intent is to encourage the determination of the possession prior to institution of a petitory action. 46 It follows common
sense as a petitory action assumes the petitioner has only better title
to and no possession of the property.
Hooper II made holdings that it was improper to cumulate a petitory action and an acquisitive prescription action, as well a boundary action cannot be cumulated with a possessory action.
Primarily to note, Louisiana Civil Code of Procedure article
3657 expressly states, “[t]he plaintiff may not cumulate the petitory
and the possessory action.” 47 It makes no prohibition, nor even mention, of a cumulation of a boundary action with either a petitory or a
possessory action, nor does it consider acquisitive prescription.
Hooper II notes that a ruling on the Hoopers’ claim of ownership
by acquisitive prescription, albeit consistent with a possessory action, would “necessarily be a determination of ownership.” 48 As
such, the court reasoned the Hoopers cumulated a petitory action
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 973.
Id. at 973-974.
LA. CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 3657 (comment (a) (2017).
Id. at art. 3657 (2017).
Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970.
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with a possessory action, waiving their possessory action. However,
as it turned out, the question was not so much whether the Hoopers
were in possession, but to what extent did they possess; the boundary had to be determined.
Boundaries are not necessarily fixed judicially, but may also be
fixed extrajudicially, through agreement by parties. In the instance
judicial fixing is necessary, the boundary action must be brought by:
an owner of the contiguous tract of land; one who is in possession
as owner; or one who has a real right in the property (i.e., a usufruct
or mineral lease). 49
Notwithstanding the possibility that the Hoopers failed to even
bring a petitory action (to which the court was seemingly aware 50),
it is disputable the court was correct to assert that the Hoopers improperly cumulated a petitory action by claiming ownership by title
and requesting to fix the boundary line. 51 Petitory and boundary actions may be cumulated because, inter alia, they both seek to establish ownership. 52 However, to boot, the court claimed improper cumulation took place when the Hoopers asserted ownership by title
and acquisitive prescription. 53 Within the same paragraph the court
contradicts itself, stating that a claim of acquisitive prescription
“may suggest to a casual reader that [it] is consistent with a possessory action . . . but . . . would necessarily be a determination of ownership.” 54
If a boundary action can be cumulated with a petitory action because they both assert ownership, and holding an action by acquisitive prescription is a determination of ownership, then why not may
a petitory action and acquisitive prescription claim be cumulated?
At any rate, the Hooper’s possession was more or less a non-issue;
49. LA. CIV. CODE art. 786 (2017).
50. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 968 (“In addition to the trespass action, the Hoopers asserted a possessory action and a boundary action . . . .”).
51. Id. at 970.
52. A. N. Yiannopoulos, 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PROPERTY §
11:31 (5th ed., West 2016).
53. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970.
54. Id.
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whether they possessed within their title was not argued, but rather
what their title encompassed. Thus, Hooper II made its inference
that the Hoopers were bringing a petitory action. 55 It would appear
then, that one cannot claim ownership through acquisitive prescription without improperly cumulating a petitory action and possessory
action, as establishing possession is necessary for acquisitive prescription, which is a determination of ownership. Presumably there
has been a mischaracterization of what constitutes a petitory action
and/or possessory action.
The First Circuit previously took up the same issues in Kadair
v. Hampton, 56 and perhaps made a bit more sense of the relationship
between boundary, petitory, and possessory actions, and ownership
by acquisitive prescription. First, Hooper II’s statement, “[b]ecause
a judgment in a boundary action necessarily involves a preliminary
determination of ownership, it arguably cannot be cumulated with a
possessory action,” 57 is arguably incorrect. Both the Civil Code and
the Code of Civil Procedure provide that a boundary action may be
used to determine ownership, as opposed to requiring a preliminary
determination of ownership. 58 Hooper II cites Kadair as authority
holding that “proof of ownership is a necessary prerequisite to establishing [a] boundary.” 59 However, this was taken from a narrow
context in Kadair. Second, jurisprudence extensively supports that
the type of possession necessary to establish ownership by acquisitive prescription is identical to the type of possession necessary to
maintain a possessory action. 60 Thus—in contrast to Hooper II’s

55. See Hooper II at 971: “Importantly, for our purposes, the Hoopers asserted that the surplus property had been conveyed to them by title, as evidence
by the phrase ‘one arpent more or less’ . . . effectively claim[ing] ownership of
the property by title.”
56. Kadair v. Hampton, 13-1171 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/10/14); 146 So.3d 694,
writ denied, 14-1709 (La. 11/7/14); 152 So.3d 177 (mem).
57. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970.
58. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 792, 794 (2017); LA. CIV. CODE OF PROC. art.
3693 (2017).
59. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970.
60. Kadair, 146 So.3d at 703.
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contention that asserting ownership by title and acquisitive prescription is an improper cumulation 61—not only should a boundary action be “cumulatable” with a possessory action, in the case of acquisitive prescription, they are mutually inclusive.
Upon review of the Hoopers’ petition, they argued to have had
“possession within title,” which on its face seems to create an improper cumulation, though as abovementioned, the Hoopers had not
expressly asserted a petitory action. 62 Perhaps, regardless of whether
it is permissible to assert ownership by acquisitive prescription and
by title, had the Hoopers claimed that they were owners of the one
arpent by good title, but also owners, separately, of the surplus
through acquisitive prescription; then they may have avoided issues
of improper cumulation altogether. However, by arguing that their
title—per the language “more or less” than one arpent—conveyed
to them the surplus, but that nonetheless they had possessed the surplus for thirty-years through ancestors-in-title, the Hoopers did precisely what the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3657 prohibits—plead in the alternative—and subjected themselves to a
court’s inferences.
CONCLUSION
Hooper II seemed to lose sight of the ultimate goal of the action—to fix a boundary—and provided debatable, largely unnecessary dicta on the relationships between petitory, possessory, boundary, and acquisitive prescription actions. However, despite difficulties navigating through the analysis of boundary, petitory, and possessory actions, Hooper II seemed to reach a result that more or less
satisfies some principles of equity. Eventually, it was determined
that the boundary be fixed according to principles of equal apportionment, despite there being a “dearth of guidance” within Louisiana’s jurisprudence on the matter, and remanded instructing the trial
61. LA. CIV. CODE art. 786 (2017).
62. See Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 268, 970; Yiannopoulos, supra note 52, at §
11:31.
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court delineate a boundary with proper property description pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1919. Seeing the
glass half-full, the Hoopers may have lost a potential bit of land, but
it was nonetheless established they own more than one arpent, granting them a piece of the surplus pie. 63

63. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 973.

